Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Tax Efforts: Evidence from Japan by Miyazaki, Takeshi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and
Tax Efforts: Evidence from Japan
Takeshi Miyazaki
Department of Economics, Kyushu University
October 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74337/
MPRA Paper No. 74337, posted 12 October 2016 07:26 UTC
1 
 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Tax Efforts: Evidence from Japan  
 
Takeshi Miyazakia 
 
a Department of Economics, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan 
 
6-19-1 Hakozaki, Higashi-ku, Fukuoka 812-8581, Japan 
Tel.: +81-92-642-4272, fax: +81-92-642-4272  
E-mail: tmiyazak@econ.kyushu-u.ac.jp 
 
Abstract 
The present study examines the incentive effects of fiscal equalization transfers on local 
corporate tax rates from theoretical and empirical perspectives. The study focuses on 
additional corporate tax on capital, which is exempt from calculations of equalization grants. 
A theoretical investigation reveals that a rise in equalization rate increases additional capital 
tax rates. The theoretical prediction is empirically examined using panel data of Japanese 
municipalities for 1990–2000. It is found that a higher equalization rate in fiscal equalizing 
transfers gives municipalities an incentive to raise corporate tax rates exempt from the 
transfer scheme. 
Keywords: Intergovernmental fiscal transfers; regression discontinuity design; tax 
competition; tax effort 
JEL classification codes: H7; H71; H77 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are common among developed and developing countries 
(e.g., Boadway and Shar, 2007). The central government, including the national and federal 
governments, pays transfers to lower governmental levels to ensure their fiscal capacities 
match their fiscal needs. These transfers can take the form of either conditional or 
unconditional grants, depending on the purpose of their provision. The structure of 
intergovernmental transfers often has incentive effects on the behavior of central and local 
governments. Given that intergovernmental transfers prevail across many countries and in 
various forms, a number of theoretical and empirical studies have addressed issues that arise 
from transferring grants from the central government to local governments. These issues 
include incentive effects of vertical and horizontal fiscal transfers, the moral hazard of 
regional insurance, and problems posed by soft budget constraints. 
 Previous investigations have focused on how equalization grants affect efficiency in 
local public goods provision in the presence of interregional tax competition for mobile 
capital. Based on numerous studies of tax competition, theoretical research on 
intergovernmental transfers has examined the mechanism whereby vertical or horizontal 
fiscal transfers alter a capital tax rate at the equilibrium arising under tax competition. The 
results indicate that fiscal equalization transfers can neutralize or alleviate horizontal fiscal 
externalities, thereby yielding efficient outcomes by insulating a tax policy from capital 
mobility (Boadway and Fratters, 1982; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006; Köthenbürger, 2002; 
Smart, 1998). More recently, theoretical studies have addressed a situation wherein the 
introduction of equalization grants could not completely correct fiscal externalities. Notably, 
this draws attention to factors that deteriorate the efficiency effects of fiscal transfers: for 
example, decentralized leadership (e.g., Akai and Sato, 2009, 2011; Köthenbürger, 2004), 
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fiscal exploitation by a Leviathan government (Köthenbürger, 2005), and elastic aggregate 
tax bases (Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006). 
Following this surge in the theoretical literature on the incentive effects of 
equalization grants, a number of relevant empirical studies have recently emerged. There has 
been a particular focus on equalization grant systems in Canada and Germany. Baretti et al. 
(2002) analyzed the effects of equalization transfers in Germany on subnational government 
behavior. After a simple theoretical investigation, the authors demonstrated that the marginal 
tax rate imposed by the equalization system exerts a significantly negative impact on state tax 
revenue. In terms of the incentive effect of fiscal equalization in Germany on local choice of 
business tax rates, Buettner (2006) estimated a treatment effect using the regression 
discontinuity design approach, which exploits discontinuities in the rules of the fiscal 
equalization system. He showed that, compared with a situation without fiscal equalization, 
higher marginal contribution rates induce municipalities to set significantly high business tax 
rates. More recent empirical studies for German cases have demonstrated that higher 
marginal equalization rates (tax-back rates) in fiscal equalization transfers lead to higher tax 
rates or lower public input at the local level (Buettner et al. 2011; Egger et al. 2010; Liu 
2014). 
Smart (2007) examined Canadian provincial tax politics in the period of 1972–2002 
and found that provinces respond to expanded equalization transfers by increasing their own 
tax rates. Dahlby and Warren (2002) analyzed fiscal incentive effects in the Australian 
equalization system and provided evidence that the equalization scheme affects states’ 
choices of tax rates. Doi (2010) examined the effect of intergovernmental transfers on 
regional economic growth in Japan and showed a negative correlation from panel Granger 
causality tests for prefectural data for 1994–2006. However, to the best of my knowledge, no 
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empirical studies have addressed the incentive effects of Japanese intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers on local tax settings.2  
 The objective of this paper is to examine the incentive effects of fiscal equalization 
transfers on local corporate tax rates from a theoretical and empirical perspective. 
Specifically, the present study focuses on an additional local corporate tax on capital in Japan, 
which local governments can arbitrarily determine within some upper limit. One important 
and interesting feature of the tax is that its revenues are exempt from the calculation of 
equalization grants. This exemption is aimed at motivating local governments to promote 
their own taxation efforts. 
 Does the fiscal equalization scheme affect the tax rates of the additional corporate 
tax? Previous theoretical researchers have paid little attention to the effects of equalizing 
transfers on the corporate tax not included in the transfers. I model the tax competition among 
local governments with regard to mobile capital in the presence of intergovernmental 
equalization transfers, where an additional tax on capital is exempt from the calculation of 
grants, and explore the incentive effect on local tax settings. The results indicate that 
equalization grants give a locality an incentive to raise its corporate tax rate.  
 Next, the theoretical predictions are empirically examined using panel data of 
Japanese municipalities for 1990–2000. Under the Japanese unconditional grant system, the 
eligibility for the transfers switches on or off discontinuously at the threshold based on fiscal 
capacity, calculated by the difference between “fiscal needs” and “fiscal revenues.” Fiscal 
capacity is observable and could be objective in the sense that municipalities cannot 
                                                            
2 In addition to those studies, recent empirical investigations have addressed the role of intergovernmental 
transfers in the light of dynamic fiscal adjustment at the local government level (e.g., Bessho and Ogawa, 2014; 
Buettner, 2009; Buettner and Wildasin, 2006). Others have conducted simulation studies of the mechanism of 
intergovernmental transfers (e.g., Dahlby and Warren, 2003; Zakalzn and Lopez-Laborda, 2011). 
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discretionally manipulate it. Eligible governments, whose fiscal needs exceed fiscal revenues, 
can receive the grants, whereas ineligible ones cannot. The grants gained by eligible localities 
decrease by 75%—termed equalization rates—if they expand the tax bases that are 
incorporated into calculation of the grants; the equalization rate for non-eligible localities is 
zero.  
 The present study attempts to estimate the treatment effects of grant eligibility by 
utilizing this discontinuous change in the equalization rate. Specifically, I estimate the sharp 
regression discontinuity (RD) coefficients from the samples close to the cutoff, exploiting the 
fact that the eligibility is observable and differs on the right and left sides of the threshold. In 
the sharp RD design variation in treatment status has to be assigned randomly around the 
threshold, which is termed the “local randomization assumption” (see, e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 
2010). The present study appears to satisfy that condition because municipalities cannot 
manipulate or falsify eligibility status. That aspect is tested using graphical evidence and 
statistical inferences that are standard in the RD design literature (e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 
1999; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). To ensure the validity 
of the present study, I follow the conventional specification testing methods and I also apply 
more recent testing methodology; e.g., the integrated mean squared-error (IMSE) optimal bin 
choice proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a, b). 
This study obtains the result that a higher equalization rate in fiscal equalization 
transfers gives municipalities an incentive to raise the tax rates for corporate tax exempted 
from the transfers. This result is consistent with theoretical predictions. Baseline sharp RD 
regressions provide evidence of the positive impact of grant eligibility on additional corporate 
tax rates. The same results are obtained from robustness checks, including regressions with 
lagged treatment effects, with or without additional covariates and specifying other functional 
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forms. Furthermore, this study confirms that the RD regressions are valid and reliable in 
terms of the graphical presentations and statistical tests noted above.  
Some countries other than Japan have exempted “extra” tax revenues, which local 
governments raised by imposing tax rates higher than a standard one, from the calculation of 
fiscal transfers. For example, in working out the general revenue support grant, the United 
Kingdom’s government employs as standard council tax revenue the amount that each local 
government could raise if it set a reasonable rate, rather than actual amount. In reality, as a 
large amount of local governments (about 98% as of 2000) apply higher tax rates than what is 
considered reasonable, the difference between revenues from the actual and reasonable rates 
can be viewed as exempt from the grant. Therefore, the results of the present study are also 
applicable to other countries, and lend important insights into relevant policy debates. 
 The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background information about 
local public finance in Japan and the Japanese intergovernmental fiscal transfer system. 
Section 3 introduces the theoretical model, which helps derive certain implications for the 
empirical examination. Section 4 presents estimation equations and discusses relevant 
econometric issues. Section 5 describes the data used in this paper, and the estimation results 
are presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes this study. 
 
2. Local Public Finance and Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Japan 
2.1 Japanese Local Public Finance 
Japan has three politically elected levels of government: national government, 47 prefectural 
governments, and municipalities (3229 as of 2000).3 Municipalities—composed of cities, 
towns, and villages—form the basic local government, whereas prefectures constitute 
                                                            
3 Through municipal consolidation since 1999, the number of municipalities has declined from about 3200 to 
1718 in 2016. 
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regional government spread across wider areas. The responsibilities of local government in 
Japan are similar to those in many developed countries.4  
 Total public spending in Japan was about 21% of GDP in 2013, while local 
government spending was 12%. Municipalities in Japan represent a major part of the public 
sector, accounting for approximately 30% of the government budget, in contrast to the 
prefectures’ share of 28%. Municipalities depend largely on the central government for funds. 
Indeed, as much as 31% of their budget comes from intergovernmental transfers; of that, 15% 
consists of unconditional grants (known in Japan as Local Allocation Tax5) and 16% consists 
of conditional grants (National Treasury Disbursements); the remaining 69% of municipal 
revenues arises from taxation (approximately 33%), bonds, and other independent resources. 
Municipal taxes mainly comprise income tax (municipal inhabitant tax) and property tax 
(fixed asset tax), which account for 45% and 42% of total tax revenues, respectively. 
Specifically, local income taxes comprise a tax on individual income (approximately 34% of 
total local tax) and a corporate tax (approximately 11%).  
 
Figure 1 inserted around here 
 
                                                            
4 Municipalities deal with basic concerns closely related to the daily lives of residents, such as registration of 
addresses, operation of elementary and junior high schools, social welfare for children and senior citizens, city 
planning, operation of waterworks and sewer systems, collection and disposal of garbage, and fire prevention. 
5 Specifically, this grant is classified into two categories: Ordinary Allocation Tax and Special Allocation Tax. I 
focus on the former—general unconditional grants—which account for 94% of the total. Special Allocation Tax 
is allocated based on special expenditure needs, such as disaster spending, and accounts for only 6% of the total. 
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Municipal corporate tax has two tax resources: per capita-based taxation (kinto wari in 
Japanese) and corporate tax-based taxation (houjinzei wari). 6  This study focuses on the 
latter—income-based corporate tax. This tax is levied on corporate tax revenues of national 
tax at a uniform standard tax rate of 12.3%. However, all municipalities have the authority to 
raise this to the maximum of 14.7%.7,8 Figure 1 illustrates the changes over time in the 
number of municipalities that imposed a corporate tax rate higher than the standard rate 
(hereinafter, “additional corporate tax”). It is evident that a large proportion of municipalities 
(about 1400 of 3200) adopted additional corporate taxation every year, but that proportion 
showed little change before 2003. At that time, Japanese municipalities had been partly 
authorized to set tax rates. Over time, municipalities have lost their entitlement to determine 
individual income tax rates and, thus, the tax rates among municipalities are fairly uniform. 
In contrast, property tax rates have shown municipal variation because municipalities had 
long been allowed to adjust those rates within a limited range the central government 
established. Another similar case is corporate tax-based taxation. Revenues from corporate 
tax-based taxation are around six to seven times greater than those from per capita-based 
taxation; of corporate tax-based revenues, almost 13% was collected from additional 
corporate taxation in 2007.  
 
2.2 Fiscal Equalization Grants in Japan 
                                                            
6 With per capita-based taxation, corporations pay a fixed amount of taxes according to their capital funds and 
number of employees. 
7  More precisely, if a corporation has facilities, such as offices and company dormitories outside the 
municipality of interest, its corporate tax base for local corporate tax is adjusted depending on the number of 
employees. 
8 The standard tax rate was 12.3% after 1981, but was amended to 9.7% in October 2014. 
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As noted above, there are two types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Japan: 
unconditional grants and conditional grants. In Japan, unconditional grants have played the 
role of reducing the vertical fiscal gap, or fiscal imbalance, between central and local 
governments in terms of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. This is because local 
governments have many duties they cannot execute using only their own revenues (such as 
local taxes). More importantly, unconditional grants help reduce horizontal fiscal disparities 
among regions (e.g., Mochida, 2006). Conditional grants mainly cover outlays on public 
works projects and municipal obligatory expenses, such as medical care, compulsory 
education, and national health insurance. The allocation of such grants varies remarkably 
according to the effects of political and bureaucratic powers. 
 The present study focuses on unconditional grants. 9  Japanese municipalities and 
prefectures may receive unconditional grants, which are calculated by subtracting basic fiscal 
revenues (BFRs) from basic fiscal needs (BFNs). However, municipalities whose BFRs are 
greater than their BFNs are unable to receive the grants. This scheme is represented as 
follows: 
Unconditional	Grants = 	 ቄBFNs − BFRs	if	BFNs > BFRs	0													if	BFNs < BFRs.  
The fiscal needs of each municipality are measured by an expenditure demand of a model 
local government, which is an “average” municipality, principally in terms of population, 
area, number of households, and length of roads.10 If realized expenditure were used as a 
basis to calculate grant payments, local governments would have an incentive to expand their 
                                                            
9 For example, Akai (2015) offers a good survey of Japanese intergovernmental transfers from an economic 
perspective. 
10 In 2015, the model municipality had a population of 100,000, area of 160 km2, 41,000 households, and 500 
km of roads. For every budgetary item of BFNs, more detailed sizes of municipality are defined.  
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spending to gain large grants. Therefore, fiscal needs are neither a realized expenditure nor a 
spending plan that the locality can readily control.  
 Concretely, fiscal needs are first calculated at specific budgetary levels. The formula 
for calculating the fiscal needs of each item is as follows: 
BFNs = unit	of	measure × unit	cost × modification	coefficients. 
Here, “unit of measure” is a measure that appropriately reflects the volume of a specific item, 
such as population, number of schools, and length of roads; and “unit cost” is computed by 
dividing the total costs of the model local government by the number of its unit of measure, 
so that it is uniform across the country. Importantly, the measures are, in principle, defined so 
that each can adequately explain a real demand. They are also sufficiently objective to avoid 
any possibility of arbitrary manipulation by localities. In the formula, “modification 
coefficients” are an indicator to adjust fiscal needs to conform to actual demands, and reflect 
the specific institutional, sociodemographic, economic, and regional characteristics of each 
municipality given that both the unit cost and unit of measure are uniform over all 
municipalities. 11  It is generally held that the calculation formulae for modification 
coefficients are complex but seem to be objective as they are based on instruments that 
municipalities cannot readily control (Mochida, 2006).12 
                                                            
11 For example, there exist modification coefficients for colder regions of Japan as well as for areas that undergo 
unanticipated rapid economic, social, or demographic changes. The former is a coefficient to give colder regions 
greater grants; the latter is a coefficient to allocate more grants to municipalities that experience such radical 
changes. 
12 It has also been argued that modification coefficients are not objective for explaining the fiscal needs of each 
municipality (e.g., Reschovsky, 2007). Among many modification coefficients, some were certainly computed 
using realized, not objective, values such as amounts of investment. However, it is not clear that municipalities 
have controlled the levels of such values to hold eligibility for the grants. This concern can be tested by 
checking for whether the BFNs discontinuously change at the threshold of eligibility. This study checks this by 
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 BFRs are defined as 75% of standard tax revenues, which are calculated in principle 
by multiplying each municipality’s tax base by the standard tax rate (which is uniform across 
the entire country). For the corporate tax-based tax, the standard tax revenue is computed by 
its one-year lagged tax base multiplied by the uniform standard tax rate of 12.4%. The 
national government asserts that revenue-raising capacity is measured objectively and 
mechanically by standard tax revenues, and that local governments do not have an incentive 
to reduce taxation so as to receive more equalization grants (MIC, 2007; Mochida, 2006; 
Okamoto, 2002). According to a statement by the national government, local governments 
are able to take advantage of the remaining 25% of tax revenues to pursue original projects, 
which gives them a motivation to attract more tax bases (MIC, 2007; Mochida, 2006; 
Okamoto, 2002).  
 In contrast, to incentivize localities to raise tax revenues by their own tax efforts, 
several tax revenues are exempt from calculation of the BFRs. This study concerns the 
exemption of “additional taxation.” To facilitate the adoption of additional taxation, tax 
revenues from the additional tax are exempted for some types of taxes. For municipalities, 
these include per capita-based and corporate tax-based local corporate taxes, fixed asset tax, 
and small-vehicle tax; for prefectures, they include per capita-based individual income tax, 
per capita-based and corporate tax-based corporate taxes, and business tax. It is a concern that 
the corporate tax-based tax revenues accruing from the additional taxation are exempted from 
the BFNs. The national government states that the exemption of additional tax revenues from 
the BFRs stimulates municipalities to make further tax efforts (MIC, 2006). 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
examining the existence of a jump for the BFRs at the cutoff given that, by definition, BFRs are a mirror of 
BFNs. 
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For this empirical investigation, I introduce a simple theoretical model of tax competition and 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Consider a country composed of ܰ local governments. A 
central government gives local governments fiscal equalization grants to fill the gap between 
their expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.  A local government determines the level of 
corporate tax rates so as to maximize identical households’ utility given intergovernmental 
tax competition for capital.13 
 Local government ݅  receives an equalization grant ݏ௜ , which is computed as the 
difference between expenditure needs ݔ௜ and fiscal capacity ݐ݇௜ + ௜ܶ if the expenditure needs 
exceed the fiscal capacity: 
ݏ௜ = ቄݔ௜ − ߩ(ݐ݇௜ + ௜ܶ)	if	ݔ௜ − ߩ(ݐ݇௜ + ௜ܶ) > 00					if	otherwise ,   (1) 
where ݐ	(0 < ݐ < 1) refers to source-based tax rate on capital ݇௜, which is uniformly levied 
by the central government. Fiscal capacity is defined as the “equalization rate,”	ߩ	(0 < ߩ <
1)—in other words, tax-back rates, marginal contribution rates (Buettner, 2006), or a tax rate 
on tax revenue (Baretti et al., 2002)—multiplied by the sum of capital tax revenue and the 
other tax revenues, ௜ܶ, included in the capacity calculation, which is given exogenously. Note 
that a local government receives no grants when its fiscal capacity exceeds its fiscal needs. 
This formula is in accordance with the above-mentioned Japanese intergovernmental transfer 
system, and akin to the transfer schemes in other developed countries, such as Sweden (e.g., 
Reschovsky, 2007).15 Each locality can independently levy the additional corporate tax on 
capital with its tax rate being ߬௜	(0 < ߬௜ < 1), which is exempt from the calculation of the 
grants. A local government’s revenues comprise capital tax revenues, which accrue both from 
                                                            
13 It is possible that local governments aim to attract more capital, or tax bases, by expanding public investment, 
as previous theoretical studies modelled (e.g., Keen and Marchand, 1997). To focus on tax efforts through an 
increased tax rate, however, this study does not model this possibility. 
15 In Japan, the equalization rate is 0.75 (75%). 
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imposing the uniform rate and from its original additional taxation, and an equalizing grant. 
Hence, its budget constraint is as follows:  
݃௜ = (ݐ + ߬௜)݇௜ + ݏ௜,  (2) 
where ݃௜ is local public spending or public consumption.  
 For simplicity, capital owners are omitted, and each locality has an identical fixed 
labor supply equivalent to its population. The total value of production ݂(݇௜) is produced 
using capital and fixed labor; the production function is assumed to be a constant return to 
scale and strictly concave with regard to capital: ௞݂ > 0, ௞݂௞ < 0. The total return to the labor 
supply is then given by ݂(݇௜) − ݇௜݂′(݇௜). Hence, private consumption ܿ௜ is expressed by 
ܿ௜ = ݂(݇௜) − ݇௜݂ᇱ,  (3) 
which is then the household’s budget constraint. Following the literature on tax competition, 
assume that capital is perfectly mobile so that the net rate of return to capital in every locality 
is equal to a common return r: 
݂′ − ݐ − ߬௜ = ݎ.  (4) 
This is a capital market-clearing condition, which holds at equilibrium. By totally 
differentiating this market-clearing condition, the following is obtained: ௗ௞೔ௗఛ೔ =
ଵ
௙ᇱᇱ < 0 . 
Assume ݇௜ + ሾ(1 − ߩ)ݐ + ߬௜ሿ ௗ௞೔ௗఛ೔ > 0  for an interior solution. The utility function of the 
representative household takes a quasi-linear form: 
ݑ௜ = ܿ௜ + ߙ௜ݒ(݃௜),   (5) 
where ߙ௜ > 0 is a parameter of ݒ, and ݒᇱ > 0, ݒᇱᇱ < 0.  
 
The government maximizes the utility (Eq. 5) with respect to the capital tax rate, subject to 
the equalization grant formula (Eq. 1), local government’s budget constraint (Eq. 2), 
household’s budget constraint (Eq. 3), and the capital market-clearing condition (Eq. 4). The 
following first-order condition is obtained: 
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ߙ௜ݒᇱ =
݇௜
݇௜ + ሾ(1 − ߩ)ݐ + ߬௜ሿ ݀݇௜݀߬௜
.		(6) 
The left-hand side (LHS) of Eq. (6) expresses marginal benefit from the public service, while 
the right-hand side (RHS) represents the marginal cost of public funds resulting from the 
increased tax rate. If there are no distortive capital taxes, i.e., the equalization rate and 
additional capital tax equal zero (ݐ = ߬௜ = 0), then the marginal cost of raising public funds 
takes one, implying absence of distortion. In contrast, from ௗ௞೔ௗఛ೔ < 0 and the constraints of ߩ, ݐ, 
and ߬௜ being from zero to one, the RHS of Eq. (6) is generally larger than one. This implies, 
as in Smart (1998) and Buettner (2006), that public spending is inefficiently low because of 
the existence of the uniform and additional taxes on capital and fiscal equalizing transfer. 
Moreover, as shown in the denominator of the RHS in Eq. (6), an additional capital tax 
exacerbates economic efficiency relative to an economy wherein the additional tax is not 
imposed as an additional capital tax does not interact with the equalization rate. Note that 
even when the equalization rate equals one, the marginal cost of raising public funds is 
greater than one because of the presence of additional capital tax. Thus, contrary to Buettner 
(2006), even under a complete equalization system, efficiency cannot be attained in this 
regime. 
 Next, consider the effects of change in the equalization rate on the additional tax rate 
chosen by localities at equilibrium. By differentiating Eq. (6) with regard to equalization rate, 
the effect on additional capital tax is determined as follows: 
݀߬௜
݀ߩ =
ݒᇱݐ ݀݇௜݀߬௜
ߑ > 0,			(7) 
where ߑ ≡ ݇௜ݒᇱᇱ ቄ݇௜ + ሾ(1 − ߩ)ݐ + ߬௜ሿ ௗ௞೔ௗ௧ ቅ + ݒᇱ
ௗ௞೔
ௗఛ೔, which is negative from the second-order 
condition. Because ௗ௞೔ௗఛ೔ < 0, Eq. (7) is negative, implying that a larger equalization rate raises 
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the additional capital tax rate of local government at equilibrium. The result can be 
summarized as follows.  
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the equalization rate increases the additional capital tax rate. 
 
The result of Proposition 1 is a little surprising: despite the fact that an additional capital tax 
is not incorporated in the transfer system, a change in the equalization rate could influence 
choice of the additional capital tax. The logic behind the result is as follows. As shown in the 
LHS of Eq. (6), other factors being constant, an increase in the equalization rate leads to 
greater marginal benefits for public services through a reduction in the grants. At the same 
time, as seen in the RHS of Eq. (6), such an increase lowers the marginal cost of public funds 
through the capital flow effect; i.e., a smaller negative effect of the additional tax rate on 
capital. As a result, to adjust the difference between the marginal benefit and marginal cost, 
the additional tax rate needs to be higher at equilibrium because a larger additional rate 
positively affects local revenue and increases the efficacy of the capital flow effect. That is, 
greater equalization rates raise additional tax rates on capital by way of a change in the level 
of public services and capital flows. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy  
4.1 Specification 
The empirical analysis attempts to test the predictions obtained in the theoretical section 
using panel data of Japanese municipalities for 1990–2000. More specifically, the current 
paper focuses on the impact of changes in the equalization rate of Japanese intergovernmental 
transfers on additional corporate tax rates, which are exempt from the grant calculation. A 
dependent variable is effective additional corporate tax rates. These are not statute tax rates 
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but rather the ratio of tax revenues from the additional taxation to corporate tax base at the 
municipality level, taking into account the variation in applicable tax rates across firm sizes. 
The policy (or regime) switch on which this study focuses is whether municipalities receive 
fiscal equalization grants. Municipalities that do not receive equalization grants are defined as 
the treatment group, whose equalization rate is zero. The control group comprises 
municipalities receiving equalization grants, whose equalization rate is 0.75; increased 
standard tax revenues reduce equalizing grants by 75% of the increase. Empirical strategy 
rests on how this definite distinction in the equalization rates between the treatment and 
control groups makes a difference in their decision making regarding setting of tax rates.  
 A sharp RD (regression discontinuity) design approach is used in this estimation. 
Sharp RD design is a research strategy applied when treatment is correlated with a forcing 
variable (or running or assignment variable) and a deterministic, discontinuous function of 
the variable (e.g., Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Receiving or not 
receiving a treatment is discontinuously determined at a cutoff point; i.e., if their forcing 
variables are above a cutoff, group members receive the treatment, and if not, they do not 
receive it. Determination of non-receiving and receiving municipalities in the Japanese 
equalization transfer system is based definitely on an observable indicator: the BFNs and 
BFRs. Thus, one key assumption for sharp RD design is satisfied. In general, eligibility for 
the equalization transfers is discussed using an indicator of fiscal capacity, which is basically 
derived by dividing the BFRs by the BFNs. This definition is used herein to argue the 
eligibility status of the grants.16 Some previous studies on the effects of intergovernmental 
                                                            
16 Note that in Japan, there is another local public finance term to represent fiscal capacity, zaiseiryoku shisu in 
Japanese. This fiscal capacity variable is defined as the three-year average of BFRs divided by BFNs and is used 
widely among local government officers and scholars in the public finance field. However, as stated above, 
intergovernmental grants are determined based on BFNs and BFRs; thus, “fiscal capacity” defined above is 
appropriate for the present research purpose. I therefore follow that definition of “fiscal capacity.”  
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transfers on tax or fiscal efforts have also adopted the RD design, and examined 
discrepancies in the treatment for grants from central and local governments (e.g., Buettner, 
2001; Liu and Ma, 2015).17 Accordingly, the current study also adopts the sharp RD design 
approach, employing several control variables to capture financial, economic, and 
sociodemographic factors, as well as the forcing variable, which determines the threshold of 
eligibility status. 
 Specifically, the following regression model is estimated: 
௜ܻ௧ = ߬ܦ௜௧ + ݂(ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧) + ࢞࢏࢚ࢼ + ݕ݁ܽݎ௧ + ߳௜௧													 
																							݅ = 1,… , ܰ, ݐ = 1990,… , 2000, 
where ௜ܻ௧  denotes an outcome variable—additional corporate tax rates. ܦ௜௧  denotes a 
treatment status with regard to eligibility for the equalization grants: 
ܦ௜௧ = ൜1	if	ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ − 1 ≥ 00	if	ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ − 1 < 0 ; 
ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ =
ܤܨܴݏ௜௧
ܤܨܰݏ௜௧ − 1, 
where ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ denotes “fiscal capacity index,” which is normalized at zero by subtracting 
one from the BFRs over the BFNs. The treatment dummy ܦ௜௧  takes the value one for 
municipalities whose fiscal capacity indices are positive; i.e., which are ineligible to receive 
equalizing grants. ܦ௜௧ is then a deterministic and discontinuous function of ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ above 
and below zero. ߬ is an RD estimator of interest, which is interpreted as the average treatment 
effect of the grants on tax rate setting, or the treatment effect for non-receiving municipalities. 
ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ is also used to explain the trend relation between dependent variables and fiscal 
capacity, with the assumption it takes several functional forms. ݂(ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧) is a polynomial 
                                                            
17 In local public finance literature, for example, Egger and Köthenbürger (2010) estimated the effect of council 
size on local government spending using a sharp RD design. To identify the causal relationship, they adopted 
the institutional characteristics that council size discontinuously varies based on population size. 
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function of ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧, where, to allow polynomial functions to take different forms below 
and above the cutoff point, two types of polynomial term are created for each order of 
polynomial: one is a polynomial term multiplied by ܦ௜௧, and the other is a polynomial term 
multiplied by (1 − ܦ௜௧). The main polynomial function is the third-order polynomial, which 
is expressed as follows: 
݂(ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧) = ෍ߛ௟௞(1 − ܦ௜௧)
ଷ
௞ୀଵ
(ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧)௞ +෍ߛ௥௞ܦ௜௧
ଷ
௞ୀଵ
(ܨܫܵܥܣ ௜ܲ௧)௞,	 
where ߛ௟௞ and ߛ௥௞ are, respectively, parameters of the polynomials to the left and right of the 
cutoff point. 
 To broadly check for robustness of the RD estimators in terms of specification in 
fiscal capacity trend, I employ linear polynomial and local linear regressions as well as the 
cube polynomial.19 Regarding the manner of selecting the order of polynomials, Lee and 
Lemieux (2010) propose using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) of model selection.20 
This study also exploits the AIC to select between the first-order and third-order polynomials. 
Robustness is ensured by running a nonparametric regression—local linear regression—as 
well. This is standard as a practical and appealing approach for estimating the treatment 
effect of sharp RD design (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
Regarding the local linear regression, Calonico et al. (2014a) mainly discussed three 
nonparametric RD estimators: conventional RD estimates with a conventional variance 
estimator (used in most empirical analyses); bias-corrected RD estimates with a conventional 
variance estimator; and bias-corrected RD estimates with a robust variance estimator. They 
                                                            
19 Quadratic and quartic polynomial forms are employed in other regressions; their results are reported in 
Appendix B. 
20 The AIC is a measure to determine the fit of an econometric model based on the coefficient of determination 
and the number of its parameter. 
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stated that in the presence of large biases with conventional RD estimators, the bias-corrected 
RD estimates with a robust variance have the most preferable theoretical properties and bring 
superior finite-sample properties in practice.21  Following this argument, based on recent 
studies, I employ bias-corrected RD estimates with a robust variance estimator as estimates of 
local linear regression. As is typical in nonparametric regressions, some kernels have been 
suggested for the RD estimation. The present study chooses the Epanechnikov kernel, one of 
the most popular kernels in local linear regression.22 
 A vector of control variables is expressed by ࢞࢏࢚, whose elements are municipal GDP 
per capita and city dummy. The city dummy is included because cities could have distinct 
attitudes toward setting the additional capital tax rate where cities and other municipality 
types (towns and villages) have different fiscal responsibilities in the sense that cities engage 
in providing a broader range of public services.23 The use of per capita municipal GDP 
closely relates to the emergence of common shocks in outcome and grant eligibility, as 
explained later. Coefficients of these variables are represented by ࢼ. Year dummies, ݕ݁ܽݎ௧, 
are also included because, as shown in Figure 1, implementation of additional corporate 
                                                            
21 Conventional RD estimates with a conventional variance estimator require the assumption of a small leading 
bias, usually not satisfied in advance; thus, they tend to choose a small bandwidth. Bias-corrected RD estimates 
with a conventional variance estimator and with a robust one correct the conventional RD estimator by adding 
an estimate of bias. A key difference between the latter two estimators is in estimated variances, used when 
calculating the confidence intervals. The bias-corrected RD estimates with a robust variance is theoretically 
attractive and has favorable finite-sample properties compared with ones with a conventional variance. Usually, 
empirical researchers employ conventional RD estimates with a conventional variance in the absence of 
considering the potential effects of the leading biases. 
22 As a robustness check, the regression results obtained using the triangular kernel, which is also popular, are 
presented. 
23 In Japan, there is a large difference between public services provided by cities and other municipalities (towns 
and villages), but differences between those of towns and villages are not great. 
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taxation takes on a decreasing trend over the sample period and the number of eligible 
municipalities varied remarkably over time. In addition, for a robustness check, the following 
variables are used as controls: log of population, population density, and taxable income per 
taxpayers. Following Egger et al. (2010), I adopted these other covariates to explain the 
demographic and economic characteristics of each municipality. Moreover, the present study 
runs regressions in which all the covariates except the treatment dummy and polynomial 
terms of the forcing variable are omitted to follow the notion that these covariates are in 
principle unnecessary in RD estimation. ߳௜௧ is a conventional error, which is clustered at the 
municipal level to deal with possible serial correlation among municipalities. 
 This research did not adopt a panel data regression approach, such as fixed-effects 
estimation. The main reason for this is that the RD analysis does not require fixed-effects 
regressions to identify a treatment effect (see, e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2010). This is because 
an identification condition for the RD design (that a treatment is randomly assigned around 
the threshold of the forcing variable) does not need any control by individual dummies. It has 
been stated that including such dummies is legitimate only when they unambiguously reduce 
sampling variance (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). From this aspect of the RD design, the 
regressions in this research do not contain fixed effects. Further, in a study closely related to 
the present one, Egger et al. (2010) did not utilize a fixed-effects approach; instead, they ran 
cross-section regressions for seven-year panel data to evaluate the average treatment effect of 
transfer eligibility on business tax rates in Lower Saxony, Germany. Within-municipality 
correlation over time is controlled by clustered standard errors. 
 
Table 1 inserted around here 
 
Table 1 lists the definitions, units, and statistical sources of the variables. 
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4.2 Econometric Issues  
4.2.1 Endogeneity and the Random Assignment Assumption 
A crucial assumption for validating a causal (or treatment) effect approach in the modern 
program evaluation literature is that no endogeneity biases contaminate an estimated 
treatment effect—in the sense that a policy change of interest is exogenous. In RD design 
studies, a valid RD estimation in which individuals cannot “precisely manipulate” the forcing 
variable around the cutoff point is needed. Once this condition has been satisfied, the 
treatment is to be assigned randomly around the cutoff (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010).24 In the present study, the necessary condition is that a municipality does not 
change its treatment status or eligibility for intergovernmental grants by deliberately 
manipulating its fiscal capacity. Were that possible, it would lead to a failure in the causal 
inference between eligibility for grants and decision making about the additional corporate 
tax rate being conditional on the control variables. In this study, eligibility to receive the 
grants depends only on BFNs and BFRs. As detailed in section 2, both are fundamentally 
calculated using exogenous or predetermined factors that local governments are unable to 
handle discretionally. BFNs are essentially calculated referring to the expenditure demands of 
the model municipalities, not the actual demands of each municipality; BFRs are quantified 
based on standard tax revenues, computed using tax rates uniform across the country. Hence, 
from an institutional perspective, it would appear difficult for municipalities to control their 
fiscal capacities—BFNs and BFRs—around the threshold. 
 
Figure 2 inserted around here 
                                                            
24 Specifically, Lee and Lemieux (2010, p. 293) state that the crucial point with a valid RD design is not whether 
individuals can manipulate the forcing variable, but whether they can precisely sort around the cutoff point. 
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One exception could occur in determining the BFRs. Uniform tax rates are employed when 
calculating BFRs, but the tax base used for the calculation in many cases has a one-year lag 
from the actual tax base. Hence, it is possible, albeit very slightly, that municipalities could 
manipulate the amount of their tax base so as to change their eligibility status.25 To address 
this concern, I depict the BFRs, averaged in each bin of the fiscal capacity index, against the 
midpoints of the index in a figure, and then check for the existence of a discontinuity around 
the threshold of allocation of the equalization grants. Additionally, this testing becomes a test 
of discontinuity of the BFNs, given that by definition of the fiscal capacity index, BFRs are a 
mirror of BFNs in terms of eligibility status. This testing approach follows the fact that in 
empirical works applying the RD strategy, plotting binned means of covariates against the 
forcing variable is a legitimate way to ensure the validity of the RD design, as stated in the 
next section.  
 Additionally, the issue of reverse causality may arise if municipalities decide on the 
additional tax rates prior to determining fiscal capacity. With the RD design, it is well 
established that the covariates have to be predetermined and observable to hold the RD 
identification assumption of local random assignment. The causal effects of grant eligibility 
on the tax rate decision would also appear to be somewhat lagged when changes in the tax 
rates demand time. Therefore, to check for robustness, I attempted regressions with one-year 
lagged covariates, including the treatment dummy, instead of with non-lagged covariates.  
                                                            
25 A possible scenario is that municipalities are reluctant to make fiscal efforts to gain more capital, for example 
by improving the infrastructure, such as roads, sewer systems, and water facilities, to retain eligibility for 
equalizing grants. This concern becomes crucial if the manipulation behavior is associated with the settings of 
the additional corporate tax rate.  
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 Another concern about endogeneity is the emergence of common shocks for both the 
dependent variable and treatment status. A booming economy generally increases the share of 
non-receiving municipalities through an increase in their tax bases, such as through income 
and land price rises. At the same time, such an economy may make the effective additional 
corporate tax rates higher—given that large firms generally face heavy additional tax burdens 
in the presence of differential taxation on large firms and that the share of large firms can 
grow after an economic boom. Some studies have tackled this problem by employing the per 
capita GDP of local governments as a proxy variable (Buettner, 2006). Accordingly, the 
present study uses municipal GDP per capita as a proxy. However, not all Japanese 
municipalities calculate municipal-level GDP; I therefore quantified it from prefecture-level 
sectoral GDPs and municipality-level employment variables. The manner of constructing the 
municipal GDP is explained in Appendix A. 
 In the RD design, if a treatment is randomly assigned around a cutoff point, the 
distribution of observed and unobserved predetermined characteristics conditional on the 
forcing variable is continuous. Equally, the density of the forcing variable conditional on the 
observed and unobserved variables is continuous (see, e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2010, pp. 293–
297). Generally, a test is performed concerning the continuity of the marginal density of the 
forcing variable over population to ensure that the local randomization assumption is satisfied. 
To test this assumption, the conventional approach is to plot the number of observations in 
each bin of the forcing variable against the midpoints of each bin, and to detect whether there 
is a discontinuity in the distribution of the forcing variable at the cutoff (McCrary, 2008). If a 
discontinuity in the density is detected at the cutoff, it is possible that individuals are 
manipulating the forcing variable, and that sorting is taking place around the cutoff. McCrary 
(2008) proposed a statistical test that evaluates the null hypothesis of no discontinuity in the 
density of the forcing variable at the threshold by employing the density as a dependent 
24 
 
variable in the local linear regression. The present study also runs this regression and inspects 
the no-manipulation assumption on the base covariate. 
 
4.2.2 Tests for Validity of the RD Design 
In practice, graphical analysis and related statistical inference are a crucial part of the RD 
design. Most important is graphing the outcome against the forcing variable, where the 
average outcomes in each bin of the forcing variable are plotted against the midpoints of the 
bins, accompanying regression lines of the corresponding flexible polynomial model (which 
are estimated separately on both sides of the cutoff). The major aim of the plotting is to find 
evidence of a jump in the conditional means of the outcome at the threshold by assessing the 
magnitude of the jump in the averaged outcome and fitted lines.27 The current study also 
examines the existence or non-existence of such jumps by graphing additional tax rates 
(averaged by bin) over bins of the fiscal capacity index along with the third-order polynomial 
regression curves—the main polynomial form used here. 
 One issue in graphical presentation is how to choose the binwidth (width of the bin). 
It has generally been found that an excessively narrow range of bin leads to an imprecise, 
noisy assessment of the outcome. If the bin is too wide, a comparison between the left and 
right sides of the cutoff becomes inappropriate since the bin does not represent the mean 
value of the outcome. Partly owing to the difficulty in formally choosing the binwidth based 
on graphical analysis, most relevant studies have arbitrarily selected binwidths that make RD 
plots visually informative in terms of representativeness of outcomes. By contrast, Calonico 
et al. (2014a, b) have recently developed a data-driven RD plot methodology (IMSE optimal 
choice), whose estimator is adjusted to produce binned sample means that well fit the 
                                                            
27 Moreover, the plotting of the outcomes against the forcing variable along with the regression lines provides a 
way of visualizing which functional forms are adequate on each side of the cutoff point. 
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underlying nonparametric function.28 The present study uses the IMSE-optimal choice for 
bandwidth choice. 29  In practice, however, the number of bins is determined, somewhat 
arbitrarily, by referring to the results from the IMSE-optimal method: as stated in Calonico et 
al. (2014a), the number of bins reported with IMSE-optimal choice is too small to visualize 
the mean values of outcomes over the midpoints of each bin. I therefore chose a larger 
number of bins than that reported for the IMSE-optimal method. 
 Another aim of depicting the outcome is to inspect whether there are unexpected 
jumps at points away from the threshold. If one observed any jumps without plausible reason 
in the conditional distribution of the outcome, the conclusion would be that the treatment was 
not randomly assigned; the jump at the cutoff could not be interpreted as a causal effect of the 
treatment. I also check for the existence of such discontinuities throughout the graph of the 
outcome. To address this problem, this study conducts a formal test as well that detects jumps 
at points (usually on both sides of the cutoff) where there should not be jumps. To execute it, 
I run a regression that is essentially equivalent to the standard RD regression function, but 
different in that the treatment thresholds are set at other points, and test the hypothesis of a 
zero treatment. This is called the placebo (effect) test, and it has become a crucial part of the 
empirical analysis of RD design. 
 An alternative graphical illustration employs the graph of other covariates (covariates 
except for the forcing variable) over bins of the forcing variable. Other changes in outcome, 
not associated with treatment status, may occur around the cutoff owing to a variation in 
other covariates. If one found a discontinuity with such a covariate, the discontinuity could 
                                                            
28 Calonico et al. (2014a, b) developed an alternative data-driven binwidth choice approach, which selects the 
number of bins so as to mimic the underlying variability of the raw data. They point out that this approach tends 
to report a larger optimal number of bins than the IMSE-optimal choice.  
29 Among the options Calonico et al. (2014b) proposed for this procedure, spacing estimators under evenly 
spaced bins are used here. 
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produce a jump in the outcome at the cutoff, thereby biasing the treatment effect of interest. 
A more formal test based on statistical inference is to test for discontinuities in additional 
covariates at the threshold by employing the covariates as a dependent variable. The 
additional covariates are then regressed on the treatment dummy along with the ordinary 
covariates. The present study plots the binned means of per capita GDP against the midpoints 
of each bin of the fiscal capacity index and then tests for a discontinuity in the GDP using the 
local linear regression, as employed in the baseline estimation. 
 Finally, choice of bandwidth is a crucial issue in RD design. Several bandwidth 
estimators have recently been proposed with the aim of obtaining the optimal point estimate 
of bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014a; Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). However, the most 
popular among empirical works is the cross-validation (CV) procedure, where an optimal 
bandwidth is determined so as to minimize the cross-validation criterion (see Ludwig and 
Miller, 2007). I compute the CV optimal bandwidths, in which the criterion was modified by 
discarding 50% of the observations to the left and right sides of the threshold. However, this 
study does not select the bandwidths because most empirical papers recommend estimating 
the RD treatment effect over some bandwidths to ensure robustness in bandwidth choice. RD 
regressions are run for the rounded width that was close enough to the CV optimal estimator 
and the other two widths on either side of the threshold.  
 
5. Data 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 inserted around here 
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Table 2 provides summary statistics for the dependent variables and all covariates for 1990–
2000, sampled in the baseline regression. The reason for using this sample period is that in 
Japan, many municipalities have ceased to exist or drastically changed their geographical 
borders since the early 2000s, owing to large-scale municipal mergers. The merger has 
caused municipalities to undergo discrete changes in terms of sociodemographic, economic, 
and financial factors. The statistics of the variables used for the regressions of additional tax 
rates (additional corporate tax rate, fiscal capacity index, per capita GDP, and city dummy) 
and a robustness check (log of population, population density, and taxable income per 
taxpayer) are calculated for the bandwidth of ±0.1, which is the baseline for this RD 
estimation.  
 As evident in Table 2, the average of additional corporate tax rates was 1.43%; among 
the sampled municipalities, 376 did not levy additional taxes (not shown in the table). City 
accounts for about 78% of municipality, which is larger than the corresponding national 
average, 21%, in 1999. The average for population is about 155,000, and its variation among 
municipalities is large: minimum population is about 2,500, while maximum is about 800,000. 
The fiscal capacity index ranges within ±0.1, and its mean is slightly less than 0. 
 
5.2 Graphical Evidence 
This section presents the following four graphs: additional corporate tax rates against fiscal 
capacity index; density of the fiscal capacity index; and per capita GDP and BFRs against the 
index. Figure 2 plots the binned means of the additional corporate tax rate against the 
midpoints of bins of the fiscal capacity index along with the third-order polynomial 
regression curves estimated on both sides of the threshold (at 0). The numbers of bins, 
equally spaced, are 30 to the left side of the cutoff and 15 to the right, and are determined 
proportionally to the IMSE-optimal bin numbers—eight to the left of the cutoff and four to 
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the right. This graph provides clear evidence of a discontinuity at the cutoff: specifically, high 
tax rates on the left side and low rates on the right. The polynomial regression curves fit the 
plotted values well. On the right side of the cutoff, however, the binned-average tax rates are 
considerably dispersed; this is because the number of observations in each bin declines as 
fiscal capacity increases (as described in the next paragraph). No remarkable discontinuities 
seem evident away from the threshold on either side. 
 
Figures 2–5 inserted around here 
 
Figure 3 presents the density of the binned means of the fiscal capacity index. The numbers 
of bins are 30 to the left and right sides of the cutoff along with the third-polynomial 
function.31 The graph displays no evidence of a discontinuity at the cutoff point, but it does 
show a smoothed declining trend in density. This suggests that municipalities did not 
manipulate their fiscal capacity to be on either side of the threshold. In Figure 4, per capita 
GDPs, averaged in each of the above-mentioned bins, are plotted over the bins of the capacity 
index together with the polynomial curves, as before. Any salient discontinuities in per capita 
GDP are not observed around the cutoff; which is to say it is not possible for a jump to affect 
additional tax rates. Figure 5 depicts the binned average of the BFRs over the bins of the 
capacity index. It is evident that there is no discontinuous jump around the cutoff point and 
the functional forms of the cube polynomial look different between the left and right sides of 
the cutoff. This provides no evidence that municipalities deliberately manipulated the BFRs, 
or the standard tax revenues, to be on either side of the cutoff. This result also suggests the 
nonexistence of discontinuity for the BFNs around the cutoff. 
 
                                                            
31 To make all bin sizes equal, the numbers of the bins are the same on both sides.  
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6. Estimation Results 
 
Table 3 inserted around here 
 
Basic estimation results of the incentive effects of fiscal equalization rate on additional 
corporate tax rates appear in Table 3. The selected bandwidths are ±0.05, ±0.1, and ±0.15; 
the ±0.1 width was selected as the baseline since the CV optimal window was ±0.12 and the 
other two bandwidths were 0.05 larger or smaller than the baseline.33 As in Table 3, for all 
specifications and bandwidths, most of the RD estimators were negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% or higher significance level. 34  It was apparent, therefore, that 
municipalities ineligible for the equalizing grants tended to choose lower additional corporate 
tax rates; namely, larger equalization rates for the equalizing grants gave municipalities an 
incentive to increase their additional tax rates. This result is consistent with the prediction 
derived in the theory. Moreover, the magnitude of the treatment decreased with the 
bandwidth length, except for the widths of ±0.1 and ±0.15 in the linear polynomial. This 
finding provides positive support for the significant effects of grant eligibility, given that bias 
in the RD estimate increases with the range of the selected bandwidth and that thus an 
estimate from a smaller bandwidth is less biased (e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Regarding 
functional form, the AICs select the cube polynomial regressions for the bandwidths of ±0.1 
                                                            
33 Panel A of Figure C1 in Appendix C depicts the CVs of the additional tax rate against every 0.025 windows; 
it shows that the CV takes the minimum when the width is almost 0.12 and the extraordinary large maximum at 
the width of 0.025. 
34 A local linear estimate with the ±0.15 width is significant at the 10% significance level, though this regression 
was not the basis of the present study in terms of either functional form or bandwidth. 
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(baseline) and ±0.15, and Figure 2 shows that the cube polynomial curves predict the actual 
data well. This analysis therefore adopts the cube polynomial regression as the baseline.  
The RD estimator of the baseline regression with the ±0.1 width indicates that a 75% 
increase in the equalization rate raises the additional corporate tax rate by 0.69%; that is, one 
percentage point increase in the equalization rate yields about a 0.1% rise in the tax rate. This 
figure is in fact within the range of the corresponding estimates obtained by previous 
research: in absolute value, smaller than the estimates obtained by Buettner (2006) (−1.37), 
Buettner et al. (2011) (0.892), and Smart (2007) (−0.40), but larger than those by Egger et al. 
(2010) (0.28% decrease in business tax rates caused by 25% decrease in equalization rate). 
 
Table 4 inserted around here 
 
Robustness checks for the RD estimates of the effect of grant eligibility appear in Table 4. 
The table lists the results of the cube polynomial regression—baseline functional form. The 
first row presents estimates of the regressions in which all additional covariates (per capita 
GDP and city and time dummies) are excluded. As before, the estimates are significantly 
negative, although the size of the coefficients becomes smaller by about 0.1%. The second 
row displays the regression coefficients estimated by including the other covariates: log of 
population, population density, and taxable income per taxpayer. As before, the obtained 
estimates are all strongly significant and negative. The third row of the table shows the 
estimates from the regressions including one-year lagged treatment dummy and polynomial 
terms, where the numbers of observations differ from before because the sample years change 
to the period of 1991–2000. The RD estimates are significantly negative and similar to the 
previous corresponding ones (second row of Table 3), although the estimates in that row are 
slightly low for every bandwidth. It is evident that the greater the fiscal equalization rate, the 
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stronger incentive municipalities have to expand their additional corporate tax rates. 
Moreover, identical consequences are obtained from the alternative robustness checks 
applying the linear polynomial and local linear regressions; the second- and fourth-order 
polynomial functions also give the same results as the others. The details are presented in 
Appendix B. 
 
Table 5 inserted around here 
 
Tests for the validity of the RD approach are also crucial for the RD design (Imbens and 
Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The first column of Table 5 presents the regression 
result concerning continuity of the density, where a dependent variable is frequency of the 
forcing variable in the bins set for the graphical analysis in Figure 3; the second column 
details a test for the misspecification on an additional covariate—per capita GDP. As in the 
first column, the null hypothesis of the zero jump in the density at the cutoff point is not 
rejected; hence, this provides evidence for supporting the no-manipulation assumption at the 
cutoff, consistent with Figure 3. The second column also suggests that the null hypothesis of 
no discontinuity in per capita GDP is not statistically rejected, which means that changes 
other than the grant eligibility do not affect the additional tax rate. This finding is consistent 
with that in Figure 4. It follows that the test results affirm the local randomization assumption.  
 Another specification test of the RD design is a placebo test, implemented by setting 
hypothetical thresholds away from the actual cutoff. Table 6 shows the regression results of 
placebo effects by placebo threshold and by bandwidth, where the cube polynomial function 
is employed. It is clear that all estimates appear insignificant, even at the 10% significance 
level, and their signs vary according to the employed threshold and bandwidth. This result is 
in line with the inference from Figure 2, whereby no other discontinuities are observed within 
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the ±0.5 bandwidth. Accordingly, this suggests that there are no detectible jumps over a 
wide range of the forcing variable; thus, the jump at the cutoff point can be interpreted as a 
causal effect of change in the treatment status. 
 To summarize, it appears from the RD analysis, applied to the effect of eligibility for 
fiscal equalizing grants on additional corporate taxation, that eligibility induces 
municipalities to raise their additional corporate tax rates. This consequence is robust for 
several functional forms, including parametric and nonparametric ones, alternative choices of 
covariates, such as a lagged treatment variable, and several bandwidth choices. Additionally, 
the validity of this RD strategy is supported by the graphical analysis and related 
specification testings.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are used to achieve various objectives of central and local 
governments, such as the following: filling the fiscal gap between central and local 
governments in revenue-raising capacity and expenditure needs; regional fiscal capacity 
equalization; and equalization from the viewpoint of the principle of horizontal equity. 
Recent research has examined the incentive the grants generate for central and local 
governments in an economy with mobile capital and tax competition on capital.  
 This study examines the incentive effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on the 
decision regarding additional corporate tax rates, from theoretical and empirical perspectives. 
Primary attention is placed on the effects of grant eligibility on the rates of the additional 
corporate tax, on which Japanese local governments have discretional power to decide. I then 
built an extended tax competition model, where jurisdictions compete with mobile capital by 
setting extra capital tax rates in the presence of fiscal equalization grants, which are 
calculated not counting tax revenues from the extra capital tax. The theoretical investigation 
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suggests that a rise in equalization rate increases the additional capital tax rates. The 
theoretical prediction is empirically examined using panel data of Japanese municipalities for 
1990–2000. Specifically, the present study estimates the causal effects of grant eligibility by 
means of the sharp RD approach, where discontinuity in the eligibility between receiving and 
not-receiving municipalities is deterministic and observable. 
 The empirical analysis finds that a higher equalization rate in fiscal equalization 
transfers induces municipalities to raise the additional corporate tax rates. Alternative 
regressions, such as excluding covariates, including other additional covariates or lagged 
treatment effect, placebo effect tests, and using other polynomial functional forms, also show 
the significant effect of the equalization grants on the additional corporate tax rates. It follows 
that equalization rates for municipalities affect the additional corporate tax rates, which are 
not incorporated into the fiscal transfer scheme. 
 Nevertheless, there are some caveats with this analysis. First, this study focuses on the 
relationship between the additional corporate taxation (unique to Japan) and Japanese fiscal 
equalizing transfers. The arguments applied here may not hold directly for decision making 
about local corporate tax rate in the presence of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in other 
countries. In general, such transfer systems vary somewhat among different countries in 
terms of aims in establishing such a scheme, mechanisms to compute and allocate grants, and 
size of transfers. Second, there is no investigation of the effects of the intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers on capital at municipalities. Although researchers in this field have paid 
attention to mobility of capital as a consequence of changes in capital tax rate, it is generally 
difficult to empirically examine changes in capital because of imperfectly mobile production 
factors and the co-location of labor and capital (Wildasin, 2011). Here, I therefore do not 
address the link between fiscal equalizing transfers and capital. Further studies should reveal 
these issues. 
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Appendix A. Creating Municipal GDP 
In Japan, the national government calculates prefectural GDP, which is classified into the 
following industries: agriculture (including forestry and fishery); mining; construction; 
manufacture; wholesale and retailing; banking and insurance; real estate; transport and 
telecommunications; service; and government and private nonprofit service. The number of 
employees in each industry is counted at the municipal level and reported annually. By 
industry, municipal GDP is then estimated as prefectural GDP multiplied by the share of its 
employees in each industry to the prefectural total. Overall municipal GDP is quantified by 
aggregating all the industry-level municipal GDPs. 
 
Appendix B. Other Robustness Checks 
 
Table B1 inserted around here 
 
Table B1 presents the results of other robustness checks. The first row shows the treatment 
effects from the linear polynomial estimation in the absence of the covariates. The 
coefficients of interest are significant and negative, albeit somewhat weakly when using the 
±0.1 width, implying the presence of adverse treatment effects. The second row displays 
estimates of the linear polynomial regressions including other covariates. These regressions 
clearly do not alter the findings I obtained from the basic regressions. The third row reports 
coefficients of the local linear regression using the Epanechnikov kernel, instead of the 
triangular kernel. The basis for running this regression is that a different kernel puts weights 
on observations in a different way, thereby producing a different RD estimator. The obtained 
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treatment effects have significantly negative signs for the first two columns.38 The fourth and 
fifth rows present other polynomial orders as flexible polynomial functions. The quadratic 
and quartic polynomial regressions both essentially give significant and negative estimates. 
Accordingly, the findings presented in Table B1 confirm the positive effect of the fiscal 
equalization rate on additional corporate tax rates. 
 
Appendix C. Graphs of Cross-Validation 
 
Figure C1 inserted around here 
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Variable Definition Unit Source
A. Dependent variables
Additional corporate tax rate Effective additional corporate tax rates, calculated as tax
revenues from additional corporate tax divided by corporate tax
base
Percentage
B. Covariates
Treatment dummy Dummy for municipalities that do not receive equalization grants - -
Fiscal capacity index Fiscal capacity index, normalized at zero, computed as basic
fiscal revenues divided by basic fiscal needs minus one
- 2
Per capita GDP Real-value municipal GDP per capita Billion JPY/thousand 1, 2
City dummy Dummy that takes value one for cities - -
Log of population Natural log of population Thousand JPY 2
Population density Population divided by area Thousand JPY/ha 2, 3
Taxable income per taxpayer Per taxpayer taxable income of local individual income tax (kojin
jumin zei in Japanese)
Million JPY/thousand 2, 4
 
Notes : The table reports the definitions, units, and statistical sources of the dependent and covariates. One JPY is equal to approximately 0.01
USD.
Source: 1 = Cabinet Office (2000–2010); 2 = MIC (2000a–2010a); 3 = MIC (2000b–2010b); 4=MIC (2000c–2010c)
Table 1. Definitions of Variables, Units, and Sources
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
A. Dependent variables
Additional corporate tax rate 1.43 0.98 0 2.40 1344
B.
Covariates
Fiscal capacity index -0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.10 1344
Per capita GDP 4.10 1.06 2.62 9.58 1344
City dummy 0.78 0.42 0 1 1344
Population 155,126 140,871 2,462 800,596 1344
Population density 28.8 218.2 0.13 11334 1344
Taxable income per capita 3.93 0.43 2.76 6.53 1344
Notes : The table reports summary statistics of a dependent variable and covariates. Bandwidths for the
variables are ±0.1. Definition and units of the variables are listed in Table 1.
Bandwidths ±0.05 ±0.1, baseline ±0.15
(1) (2) (3)
Model
Linear polynomial regression -0.425*** -0.232** -0.255**
(0.157) (0.115) (0.100)
     AIC [1903.3] [3626.3] [5587.7]
Cube polynomial regression, baseline-0.721** -0.687*** -0.406**
(0.300) (0.223) (0.185)
     AIC [1909.1] [3617.0] [5585.7]
Local linear regression -0.591** -0.404** -0.236*
(0.240) (0.172) (0.141)
Observations 691 1344 2041
Table 3. Sharp RD Estimates of the Effects of Equalization Grants on Additional Corporate
Tax Rates: Baseline
Notes : The table reports RD estimates for the effects of fiscal equalization rate on additional
corporate tax rates, where data source is Japanese municipalities for 1990–2000. Cluster
robust standard errors are in parentheses; AICs are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Each sample is restricted to the bandwidths
described in the top row of this table. Every regression except the local linear regressions
includes as controls per capita GDP as well as city and year dummies. The local linear
regressions present bias-corrected RD estimates with robust standard errors, where the
Bandwidths ±0.05 ±0.1, baseline ±0.15
(1) (2) (3)
Excluding covariates -0.642** -0.583** -0.316*
(0.302) (0.225) (0.186)
Including other covariates -0.665** -0.653*** -0.408**
(0.280) (0.210) (0.172)
One-year lagged treatment -0.618* -0.647*** -0.394**
(0.315) (0.231) (0.189)
    Observations [656] [1265] [1915]
Table 4. Robustness Check
Notes : The table reports robustness checks for the effects of equalization rates on
additional corporate tax rates, where the cube polynomial function is employed. Cluster
robust standard errors are in parentheses. Observations for the regressions with one-year
lagged treatment are in brackets; observations for the other regressions are the same as
those in Table 3. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Each
sample is restricted to the bandwidths described in the top row of this table. Every
regression includes as controls per capita GDP as well as city and year dummies.
Dependent variable Frequency of the forcingvariable Per capita GDP
(1) (2)
Treatment effect -7.141 -0.042
(12.522) (0.197)
Observations 60 1344
Table 5. Tests for Validity of the RD Design
Notes : The table presents test results for the validity of the RD strategy. In the first
column, frequency of the forcing variable is regressed on the treatment dummy,
where the numbers of the bin (sample size) are 30 to the left and right sides of the
cutoff; in the second column, per capita GDP is on the treatment variable, where the
sample is restricted to the bandwidth of ±0.1. In both estimations, the local linear
regressions with the triangular kernel are adopted, where bias-corrected RD
estimates with robust standard errors are reported. *, **, and *** denote significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Placebo thresholds -0.075 -0.05 -0.025 0.025 0.05 0.075
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bandwidths
±0.05 -0.637 0.187
(2.296) (2.320)
    Observations [781] [593]
±0.1, Baseline 1.778 -1.525 0.343 0.503 1.966 -2.287
(3.500) (1.366) (0.580) (0.794) (2.161) (4.419)
    Observations [1797] [1636] [1496] [1225] [1096] [970]
±0.15 -1.858 -0.596 0.277 0.545 0.885 1.158
(1.278) (0.647) (0.328) (0.476) (0.983) (1.882)
    Observations [2678] [2447] [2241] [1873] [1664] [1506]
Notes : The table reports the placebo effect tests of fiscal equalization rates on additional corporate tax rates, obtained from the
cube polynomial function. Placebo thresholds are listed in the top row; the number of observations, described in brackets,
varies by placebo threshold and by used bandwidth. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Every regression includes as controls per capita GDP as well as city and year
dummies.
Table 6. Tests for Placebo Effects of Equalization Grants on Additional Corporate Tax Rates
Bandwidths ±0.05 ±0.1, baseline ±0.15
(1) (2) (3)
Excluding covariates in linear polynomial -0.370** -0.198* -0.253**
(0.155) (0.120) (0.106)
Including other covariates in linear polynomial -0.420*** -0.216** -0.216**
(0.143) (0.109) (0.098)
Local linear regression with Epanechnikov kernel -0.606** -0.368** -0.202
(0.246) (0.171) (0.139)
Other orders of polynomial
Quadratic -0.633*** -0.354** -0.236*
(0.236) (0.167) (0.141)
Quartic -0.388 -0.741*** -0.640***
(0.361) (0.275) (0.227)
Observations 691 1344 2041
Table B1. Other Robustness Checks
Notes : The table reports other robustness checks for the effects of equalization rates on additional
corporate tax rates, where adopted functional forms differ from the previous regressions. The second and
third regressions from the bottom are estimates from the quadratic and quartic polynomial models, where
per capita GDP, city and year dummies are included as controls. Cluster robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Each sample is restricted
to the bandwidths described in the top row of this table.
Figure 1. Change in Proportion of Municipalities Adopting Additional Corporate Taxation and 
Municipalities Not Receiving Equalizing Grants, 1985–2005 
 
 
Figure 2. Additional Corporate Tax Rates against Fiscal Capacity Index 
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Figure 3. Density of Fiscal Capacity Index (Forcing Variable) 
 
 
Figure 4. Per Capita GDP against Fiscal Capacity Index 
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Figure 5. Basic Fiscal Revenues against Fiscal Capacity Index 
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Figure C1. Cross-Validation against Bandwidth 
A. Case of Additional Corporate Tax Rate 
 
 
B. Case of Corporate Tax Base 
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